Energy Costs Send Consumer Prices Skyward by Steven P. Lanza
Energy Costs Send Consumer
Prices Skyward
By Steven P. Lanza
Prices are up across the U.S. and especially in Connecticut,
according to surveys conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics
and the Connecticut Center for Economic Analysis.  The sign of
an overheated economy that the Fed had so feared?  Or the
result of a supply shock like those that pitched us into recession
in 1974, 1982 and 1990?  The evidence points to the latter, but
we don’t yet know whether the slowdown will degenerate into
full-blown recession.  There’s no question, though, that the
surges in consumer prices were driven by higher energy costs.
The U.S. Experience
In 2000, U.S. prices jumped 3.3%.  That pace hardly seems
alarming but it represents a jump of half over 1999’s rate, and a
doubling of the 1998 pace.  Was this uptick the result of wide-
spread  price pressures throughout the economy?  Hardly.  In
most cases, price increases remained fairly constant between
1999 and 2000.  U.S. food prices increased by 2.2% in both
years.  Apparel prices dropped 1.3% in 1999 and another 1.2%
in 2000.  Costs for medical care rose 3.5% in 1999, and by a
comparable 3.9% in 2000.  And entertainment prices were up
0.9% in 1999 and 1.2% in 2000.  Actually, only two sectors of
consumer spending were hit by accelerating prices: housing and
transportation.  Housing prices grew by 3.3% in 2000 compared
with 2.2% in 1999, and transportation prices shot up 6.1% in
2000 compared with 2.0% in 1999.  
Why was the price jump confined to these sectors?  The rea-
son, of course, is that housing and transportation are the most
sensitive to increases in energy costs, and the big story of 2000
was the OPEC-orchestrated jump in oil prices.  Energy costs rep-
resent about 11% of the cost of housing, about 15% of the cost
of transportation, but only 6% of the overall CPI.  And in 2000,
energy costs jumped by 16.6%, compared with just a 3.6%
increase in 1999.  Heating oil shot up by half, from 90¢ per gal-
lon in 1999, to $1.34 in 2000.  Gasoline climbed by nearly a
third, from $1.17 per gallon to $1.51, and natural gas moved
from 69¢ to 79¢ per therm.  Only (regulated) electricity prices
held steady at about 8.7¢ per kilowatt-hour.
Thus, while the overall U.S. CPI advanced 3.3% with energy
prices included, prices of all items less energy grew a full per-
centage point less, by just 2.3%.  And that figure shows very lit-
tle change from previous years: In 1999, prices apart from energy
increased 2.0%, in 1998 2.3%, and in 1997 2.5%.  So the added
rise in the CPI in 2000 was due entirely to higher energy prices. 
The Connecticut Experience
Connecticut’s experience was a bit different.  Prices, as report-
ed by the CCEA’s Connecticut Price Survey (CPS), lurched for-
ward a stunning 6.7% in 2000.  Food prices rose by 6.2%, hous-
ing by 8.9%, transportation by 5.6% and medical care by
9.3%—all at or above comparable U.S. figures.  Excluding ener-
gy, prices behaved more reasonably, but not by much—the rate
of increase still averaged 6.1%.  Why was Connecticut’s reported
price change so high?  Two reasons: measurement problems, and
methodological differences.  Adjusting for these differences,
Connecticut’s experience was more like that of the U.S.
The CPS is narrower and less exacting than the CPI.  It sam-
ples a relatively small number of items at relatively few outlets
and such small samples tend to be more volatile and more sensi-
tive to sampling error.  Consider this odd result.  In 1999, the
CPS reported that Connecticut’s food and medical prices were
unchanged from the previous year.  Then, suddenly in 2000,
those prices rose at more than double the U.S. rate.  One way
that can happen is if a survey misses a price change one year,
but then records prices correctly the following year.  The miscue
has the effect of concentrating the entire two-year price change
in the second year.  A better measure of the actual price change
would split the difference, assigning half the increase to 1999
and the other half to 2000.  Adjusting food and medical prices
this way (and preserving the previous adjustment for energy
prices) Connecticut prices increased not by 6.7%, as reported,
but by 5.3%.
Methodological differences may also help account for part of
the discrepancy.  The two surveys measure the cost of home
ownership differently.  The CPI uses the owner-equivalent rent
method, which imputes to homeowners a cost of ownership
equal to what the property would rent for on the open market.
In contrast, the Connecticut price survey imputes to homeown-
ers a cost of ownership equal to the size of a mortgage payment
on a typical home sold in the most recent quarter.  Therefore,
whereas the CPS picks up the cost of mortgage financing, the
U.S. CPI does not.  And though interest rates declined during
2000, they remained higher than in 1999, and this gave the CPS
an upward price bias.  Excluding interest rates, and making the
other adjustments suggested above, Connecticut’s rate of price
change in 2000 would have been about 4.0%.  That’s still nearly
twice as high as the U.S. rate for all items less energy, but it’s
probably a more realistic figure than the one actually reported
by the survey.
What It Means
Higher prices, a jittery stock market, falling confidence, sink-
ing profits, and interest rates that still remain high are producing
a potentially toxic economic brew.  Our three most recent reces-
sions have followed energy-related supply–side shocks, and
energy prices may still be on the rise.  But if prices are growing
faster in Connecticut, you won’t find any evidence in factor mar-
kets: average hourly manufacturing wages in Connecticut rose
more slowly last year than in the U.S. as a whole for the first
time in four years.  What’s more, historically high energy prices
have made Connecticut relatively energy efficient, putting a
blanket of insulation between its energy users and the energy
market, that cushions the shock of higher prices.  It’s likely
Connecticut may be more sensitive than most states to edginess
on the stock market, but don’t bet on higher energy prices keep-
ing the Connecticut economy down for long.
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By Steven P. Lanza
The good news is the GDI gained
ground in 2000-Q4.  The bad news
is that revised figures for 2000-Q3
show that the GDI had actually
slipped backward for the first time
since Connecticut’s Great Recession
in the early 1990s.
The coincident GDI grew from a
revised 114.4 in 2000-Q3 to 114.6 in
2000-Q4, or at an annual rate of
0.6%.  The revision for 2000-Q3
means that the index had slipped
back by a discouraging, but small,
0.2%.  The last time the coincident
GDI lost ground was 1993-Q4,
when the state was still shaking off
the effects of the recession.  This
quarter’s rebound springs from an
improvement of sorts in the
Connecticut Manufacturing
Production Index.  The CMPI
dropped 4.1% between 1999-Q3
and 2000-Q3, but only declined
1.1% in 2000-Q4.  Without this
“boost,” the coincident GDI would
have dropped another 0.2%.  Jobs
and real income grew slowly, by
1.1% and 1.6% respectively, but at
least they grew.
The leading GDI has been signal-
ing potential weakness in the coin-
cident index for some time, drop-
ping for seven of the last ten quar-
ters, including a 0.8% decline in
2000-Q4.  But the size of the
declines has been modest, averag-
ing 0.7%—a pace more like the
“soft landing” in the mid-1990s
than the crash dive in the early
1990s.  Only a small drop in initial
unemployment claims added
strength to the leading index in
2000-Q4, though the decline was
smaller than those in the previous
five quarters.  Housing permits,
weekly hours, and help–wanted
advertising each exerted a drag;
permits held the index back less
than in the previous two quarters,
while the other two held the index
back more.
The GDI is a composite measure
of the four-quarter change in three
coincident and four leading econom-





As the ‘R’ word is increasingly
bandied about, many economists are no
longer asking when but rather how long
and how deep the next economic slow-
down will be. Will a combination of fis-
cal and monetary policy result in a soft
landing, or are we headed for something
much deeper and more severe?
With the national economy not
expected to grow at all this quarter,
Connecticut’s economy is not far from
the same mark. Revised estimates peg
Real Gross State Product (RGSP) growth
at a paltry 0.8% between 1999-Q4 and
2000-Q4.  This year the economy is
expected to rebound slightly, growing at
1.2% in 2001-Q1 but dipping to growth
of 0.9% by 2001-Q2 before ending the
year with fourth quarter growth at 1.4%.
The Connecticut employment picture is
also less rosy. We expect job growth to
slow from 1.1% in 2000-Q4 to 0.8% in
2001-Q1 and further to 0.4% by 2001-Q4.
These numbers mean the total year-over-
year job gain would be a mere 6,000 by
the end of 2001.  That figure is down sig-
nificantly from the 22,000 new jobs gener-
ated in 2000. These changes augur a defi-
nite cooling of Connecticut’s red-hot labor
market.  
Our other indicators also show signs
of a slowing economy. Connecticut real
manufacturing earnings, housing per-
mits, and real personal income have all
decreased slightly on a year-over-year
basis. Slowing real personal income, in
particular, may constrain consumer
spending and thus limit prospects for
economic growth.
Despite these warning flags, our fore-
cast favors a soft landing for
Connecticut. Growth nationally and
statewide will approach zero, but current
information suggests we will rebound to
a modest pace of growth by the end of
the year. Consumer confidence, dimmed
by slowing income, higher energy prices
and rising media hype, will play a key
role in determining whether or not the
economy slows or crashes. The next few
quarters will give us more insight into
how consumers will respond to the news
that the economy is ‘landing’. If confi-
dence recovers, we are likely to see
Greenspan’s hoped-for soft anding rather
than a crash landing. 
Where the lines branch out, the blue line shows
the predicted values for RGSP and jobs, and the
green lines show a one-standard deviation mar-
gin-of-error around the forecast.  
The New Economy: Soft Landing 
or Crash Landing?